

JOURNAL OF
ECUMENICAL
STUDIES

PLURALISM,
PROSELYTISM,
AND NATIONALISM
IN EASTERN EUROPE

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WINTER-SPRING, 1999
VOLUME XXXVI
NUMBERS 1-2
TEMPLE UNIVERSITY



olic minority had two apostolic administrators without formal dioceses, sixty-three parishes, and fifty-four (mostly foreign) priests.⁴² Did Orthodox charges of Catholic proselytism reflect genuine fears of a Catholic takeover, or were they merely a disguise for the Orthodox Church's own lack of self-confidence? Whatever the truth, they clearly reflected an excessively administrative conception of the church, measured in terms of membership, territory, power, and influence, rather than in the dignity and subjectivity of bodies and souls. It will open the door to grave injustices if the preferences of larger churches are allowed to determine the rights of smaller ones, if legal curbs and cultural pretexts are applied as a substitute for evolutionary solutions, and if arbitrary, inexact criteria are used to restrict fundamental human rights.

For now, we must continue living with the myths and counter-myths of a changing world, their durability well summed up by Poland's only Catholic daily, at a time when Russian Orthodox leaders in Russia were being criticized for their talk of "canonical rights":

We Catholics can state without shyness that contemporary Catholic churches have largely Polish roots, not just those east of the River Bug, but also those west of the Oder or across the Baltic, reaching to Sakhalin and the Japanese islands. . . . Catholicism spread to the Protestant lands of western Pomerania and Brandenburg, and to the Orthodox territory of Russia, where Polish Catholics gave the salt of pluralism to hitherto confessionally closed societies. The Polish metric is visible from St. Hedwig's cathedral in Berlin to Moscow's Immaculate Conception Church, from Vilnius Cathedral to the churches in Harbin, Vladivostok, and Irkutsk. . . . Everywhere in the east, and often in Germany and Scandinavia, Polish is used in the liturgy. It is possible to speak in Polish in curia, seminaries, and parish houses not only in Lviv, Grodno, and Minsk, but also in Riga, Karaganda, Novosibirsk, Prague, and Bratislava.⁴³

In both "Orthodox Russia" and "Catholic Poland," quantitative criteria have prevailed over qualitative ones, allowing religious believers to be treated as commodities subject to the property rights of predominant churches. Here, as elsewhere, the rights to belong or not belong are formally enshrined and recognized. If a theology of proselytism is needed, it is one that will ask the right questions — not which church people belong to, but what people actually claim to believe and why they have chosen to change or to maintain those beliefs. It must also be a theology that takes account of grace and the presence of God.

In reality, the fault for today's disputes lies both with those who see proselytism as a threat and with those who scorn their accusations, since both have mistakenly defined what is at stake. The real issue is the contemporary passion with new forms and manifestations of the sacred, which has left all

⁴²Jonathan Lixmoore, "In Russia, Signs of Orthodox-Catholic Dente," *National Catholic Register*, January 8, 1995. Also see figures cited by Jonathan Lixmoore in *The Tablet*, December

churches wondering how to preserve their own spiritual legacies — by incorporating or rejecting, applauding or condemning. These, rather than how to combat proselytism, are the questions all churches will be facing in the twenty-first century.

Journal of Ecumenical Studies, 36:1-2, Winter-Spring, 1999

FAITH AND (IN)TOLERANCE OF MINORITY RELIGIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ROMANIA, UKRAINE, AND POLAND

Julie Mertus and Kathryn Minyard Frost

Introduction

Places of worship have recently become revitalized in Central and Eastern Europe, bringing back worshippers committed to explore their faith. Where under communism one's relationship to religion was often private and even secretive, today the public identity of an increasing number of Eastern Europeans is closely tied to religion. In many areas, religion and national identity go hand-in-hand, and thus the project of reconstructing religious identity becomes synonymous with the revitalization of the nation.¹ Religion, like language, culture, and story-telling, may be an important component of the "imagined communities"² that are attempting to carve out a space for themselves as borders and powers shift in the new Eastern European geography. In this sense, religion becomes "publicized."

Both majority and minority nations find religion a useful tool in their quest to reshape their identities and gain power. These new "ethnarchies," to use the term coined by G. M. Tamas, demand that states "be reshaped at will, . . . regardless of ancient ties between different linguistic, religious, or other groups through centuries. Only natural identity counts, an identity based on a 'nature' that cannot be approached rationally."³ A person's religion is a matter of "natural identity." That is, Romanians are said to be "naturally" Orthodox; Ukrainians, also "naturally" Orthodox but of a Ukrainian Orthodox variety; and Poles, "naturally" Roman Catholic. In other words, authentic Romanians and Ukrainians are Orthodox, and an authentic Pole is Catholic. Those who step outside their natural designations — for example, those who chose a new religion or minority religion — are deemed traitors to their group. Those who have long been outside the majority "natural" designation are

¹See John Anderson, "Towards a Theory of Nationalism," in Sukumar Pertiwal, ed., *Notions of Nationalism* (Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 1995), pp. 36-37. ²Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nation-*

is most often linked to faith itself, to individual belief, and to the sometimes communal and shared expression of that faith at the core of which is a transcendent power.⁸ The public appropriation of religion by competing nations dilutes the message of faith and places at its core a corporate entity that is more concerned with power consolidation than with any religious doctrine. As such, publicization of religion in Central and Eastern Europe can be conceptualized as a form of civil religion, the purpose of which is "to sanctify modern pluralistic states — which are characterized by increased differentiation and the separation of religious institutions from significant economic, political, and cultural ones — by supplying some common goals and visions to their citizens."⁹

Like traditional religion, civil religion "offers a meaning system comprising symbols, beliefs, myths, values, practices, and rituals; and it evokes the involvement of its adherents by imposing obligations."¹⁰ The civil religion of nationalists found in Central and Eastern Europe "largely extended and modernized (although did not replace) 'religious imaginings,' taking on religion's concerns with death, continuity, and the desire for origins."¹¹ Most important, national myths have come to supplant¹² and/or become suffused with religious myths.¹³ Unlike other types of civil religion witnessed elsewhere, the civil religion of Central and Eastern European states and nations does not seek to accommodate the beliefs and behavioral patterns of nonreligious populations or of less dominant religious patterns but, rather, seeks to support a single set of values and symbols that represent their own goals and interests.¹⁴ Thus, states and nations often find themselves in conflict with those who exercise their new consumer ability to choose an alternative expression of

⁸It should be noted that transcendent power is conceptualized differently according to cultures or, perhaps more accurately, to different modes of thought. See Wolfgang Ickentischer, *Modes of Thought: A Study of the Anthropology of Law and Religion* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1995), p. 51.

⁹Rina Neeman and Nissan Rubin, "Ethnic Civil Religion: A Case Study of Immigrants from Rumania in Israel," *Sociology of Religion* 57 (Summer, 1996): 195. See also Michael W. Hughes, *Civil Religion and Moral Order: Theoretical and Historical Dimensions* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1983); Robert N. Bellah and Phillip E. Hammond, *Varieties of Civil Religion* (San Francisco, CA: Harper & Row, 1980); Robert N. Bellah, "Civil Religion in America," *Daedalus* 96 (Winter, 1967): 1-21. For critiques of the concept of civil religion, cf. Christopher G. A. Bryant, "Civic Nation," *Civil Society*, John A. Hall, ed., and Ronald F. Thiemann, *Religion in Postmodern Society* (Cambridge, U.K.: Polity Press, 1995), pp. 136-157; and David G. Reardon, *Public Life: A Dilemma for Democracy* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1996).

¹⁰Neeman and Rubin, "Ethnic Civil Religion," p. 195.
¹¹Timothy Brennan, "The National Longing for Form," in Homi K. Bhabha, ed., *Nation and Narration* (London and New York: Routledge, 1990), p. 50 (commenting on nationalism generally and on Benedict Anderson).
¹²See Yael Tamir, "Reconstructing the Landscape of Imagination," in Simon Caney, David George, and Peter Jones, eds., *National Rights, International Obligations* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), pp. 85-101.
¹³See Michael Anthony Sells, *The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1996).
¹⁴For an analysis of civil religion and the treatment of "others" in Serbia and Croatia, see Syphean Gabriel Mestrovic, *The Road from Paradise: Prospects for Democracy in Eastern Europe* (Human Societies, p. 226).

simply the "other," who may be tolerated but who need not be supported. Religion as imagined and manipulated by leaders and followers becomes a thread strung between those competing nations that remain ever willing to grab it in times of insecurity. The thread wears thin as tension mounts and as political leaders increasingly claim religion as an agent serving their vision of the public sphere.

The publicization of religion has been accompanied by a competing demand for renewed privatization. For many individuals in Central and Eastern Europe, the open expression of religion has become more of a personal matter, anchored in individual consciousness and a growing demand for individual choice. The buzz word of the day being trumpeted by international leaders and Western leaders is "privatization," and it is to be expected that modern societies will be marked by secularization and the "privatization" of religious matters.⁴ According to this reformulation, Robert Hadden reminds us that "religion may become capable of maintaining its traditional function as a mechanism of social control at least in some parts of human societies . . . [but] certainly religion is not to be taken seriously as a [cosmic] earth-moving force."⁵ This thinking opens a small, contested space for minority religions.

It is the youth of Central and Eastern Europe who have most quickly adopted a consumer orientation, as new ideas, products, and peoples have flooded their once limited marketplaces. The youth experiment in constructing their identities is based on the widening choices before them. "The consumer orientation . . . is not limited to economic products but characterizes the relation of the individual to the entire culture."⁶ The consumer's preferences toward religions "still remain a function of the consumer's social biography,"⁷ but within these limitations consumers have great latitude within which they may choose to experiment with their families' faith and with the choices offered by others. Within this context one can understand why the clash between majority faiths and those brought by outsiders may as likely appear to be a struggle between older traditionalists and youthful nonconformists or a fight between the older members of a traditional religion and its more vocal youthful members who wish to redefine the contours of their faith and the actions it takes in society.

This privatization of religion, appropriated especially by youthful consumers, is experienced by many as an entirely different phenomenon, one related to faith and the other to politics. It is the private choice of religion that

⁴Cf. Göran Therborn, "Routes to/through Modernity," in Mike Featherstone, Scott Lash, and Roland Robertson, eds., *Global Modernities*, Theory, Culture, & Society (London: Thousand Oaks, CA, and New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1995), p. 134.

⁵See David Held, *Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance* (Cambridge, U.K.: Polity Press; Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995), p. 36; and Jeffrey K. Hadden, "Challenging Secularization Theory," in Anthony Giddens, ed., *Human Societies: An Introductory Reader in Sociology* (Cambridge, U.K.: Polity Press, 1992), p. 236 (critiquing this thesis).

⁶Thomas Luckmann, "Religion and Personal Identity in Modern Society," in Giddens,

faith, be it either the majority faith expressed in an alternative manner or a minority religion.

In light of these trends, we propose to go beyond the narrow confines of either the secularization or publication thesis of religious life in Central and Eastern Europe, in order to explore existing attitudes and beliefs and their relationship to government practices. It is in this vein that we ask: Who are the new faithful in Central and Eastern Europe? What are their attitudes toward those who practice minority faiths? How far will they go in endorsing government restrictions on the rights of minority faiths to proselytize? Are the faithful, in fact, in conflict with present government policies, or do they tend to see such policies as legitimate?

Very few studies have been conducted on religion in Central and Eastern Europe, and the few that have been commissioned have focused on the collection of evidence as to whether formal legal guarantees for religious freedom are observed or abridged. These studies tend to overlook the attitudes and beliefs of the populations observed and their opinions about minority religions and state practices toward such faiths. The field of psychology of religion¹⁵ has a long tradition of analyzing such relationships; however, this field has only begun to emerge in Central and Eastern Europe. The present study has the dual goal of contributing, first, to the opening of Central and Eastern Europe to the field of psychology of religion and, second, to the better understanding of the relationship between attitudes and beliefs and the law. This study posits that, in nontotalitarian societies (as the countries of Central and Eastern Europe now describe themselves), law does not work well as a measure of social control unless it is accepted by the general public as legitimate.¹⁶ Drawing from earlier psychology-of-religion analysis, the pres-

¹⁵For a survey of psychological theories, see David M. Wulff, *Psychology of Religion: Classic and Contemporary Views* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1991); and Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi and Michael Argyle, *The Psychology of Religious Behavior, Belief, and Experience* (London and New York: Routledge, 1997). See also Andrew Reid Fuller, *Psychology and Religion: Eight Points of View* (Lanham, MD, and Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 1994); Maurice S. Friedman, *Religion and Psychology: A Dialogical Approach* (New York: Paragon House, 1992); Margaret Gorman, ed., *Psychology and Religion: A Reader* (New York and Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1985); Nancy L. Alpert, *Religion and Psychology: A Medical Subject Analysis and Research Index with Bibliography* (Washington, DC: Abbe Publishers Association, 1985).

¹⁶Max Weber used the concept of "legitimacy" in the sociology of law to refer to the way in which a ruling elite maintained its rule by satisfying the masses that governance was proceeding through abstract rules that were applied equally to everyone and that no one was above the law. Political scientists such as Joshua Cohen use the idea of "democratic legitimacy" to refer, instead, to the notion that "the authorization to exercise state power must arise from the collective decisions of the members of a society who are governed by that power." The concept of legitimacy used here draws from law and psychology and, as explained in the text, is much broader than that used by Weber and considerably different from that used by political scientists. See Joshua Cohen, "Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy," in Seyla Benhabib, ed., *Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 95. In the same volume, see also Seyla Benhabib, "Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy," pp. 67-94. For a brief outline of Weber, see William J. Chambliss and Donald P. Critchlow, *Law and Power* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1982).

ent study hypothesizes that populations distrustful of minority groups, including but not limited to minority religions, are most likely to view government restrictions on such groups as legitimate. Studies of populations in the U.S.A. have used a variety of measures of piety—such as religious affiliation, church attendance, doctrinal orthodoxy, and the rated importance of religion—to find positive correlations with "ethnocentrism, authoritarianism, dogmatism, social distance, rigidity, intolerance of ambiguity, and specific forms of prejudice, especially against Jews and blacks."¹⁷ Can a similar relationship be found in Central and Eastern Europe? The authors have begun to examine this question through the field work described below. The short answer is a tentative yes, just as in the U.S.A. a relationship may exist between strong religious sentiments and a prejudice toward minorities and the acceptance of government restrictions aimed at minority groups. Before explaining the survey and its limitations, this essay first outlines the context in which the study was conducted.

1. The Field: Assumptions and Practices

State legal practices toward religion can be placed on a continuum: from measures that seek the elimination of a religion, such as laws attacking and dismantling a faith or a set of practices; to measures that permit the existence of a certain faith, such as laws of indifference; to measures that respect differing faiths, such as human rights and nondiscrimination laws; to measures working toward the development of religion generally or toward certain faiths, such as financial support of places of worship and religious education. Quite rapidly after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Romania, Ukraine, and Poland tended to move away from measures restrictive of all religious faiths to a combination of measures reaching across the spectrum sketched in Figure 1, below.¹⁸ For the most part, human-rights-watch groups have been able to note a vast improvement with respect to freedom of religion in Central and Eastern

¹⁷Wulff, *Psychology of Religion*, pp. 219-220. See especially the following studies: James E. Dittes, "Psychology of Religion," in Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson, eds., *The Handbook of Social Psychology*, vol. 5, 2nd ed. (Reading, MA: Menlo Park, CA: London; Don Mills, ON: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1969), pp. 602-659. See also Robert L. Gorsuch and Daniel Aleshire, "Christian Faith and Ethnic Prejudice: A Review and Interpretation of Research," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 13 (September, 1974): 281-307; Raymond A. DiGiuseppe, "Dogmatism Correlation with Strength of Religious Conviction," *Psychological Reports* 28 (February, 1971): 64; N. T. Feather, "Evaluation of Religious and Neutral Arguments in Religious and Atheist Student Groups," *Australian Journal of Psychology*, vol. 19, no. 1 (1967), pp. 3-12; Graeme R. Newman, Donald J. Arctico, and Carol Trilling, "Authoritarianism, Religion, and Reactions to Deviance," *Journal of Criminal Justice* 2 (Fall, 1974): 249-259; Marton P. Steininger, Barbara E. Durso, and Carolyn Pasquarillo, "Dogmatism and Attitudes," *Psychological Reports* 30 (February, 1972): 151-157; Dorothy H. Swindell and Luciano L'Abate, "Religiosity, Dogmatism, and Repression-Sensitization," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 9 (Fall, 1970): 249-251; Leonard Weiler, Samuel Levinbok, Rina Maimon, and Asher Shaham, "Religiosity and Authoritarianism," *The Journal of Social Psychology* 95 (February, 1975): 11-18.

¹⁸See, generally, Paul Mojzes, *Religious Liberty in Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R.* (New York: New York University Press, 1982).




Figure 1. Continuum of Legitimacy

Europe because treatment toward most faiths tends to lie in the center of this continuum, hovering between existence/indifference to respect/human rights. There are, in fact, few government restrictions on establishing and maintaining places of worship in Romania, Ukraine, or Poland,¹⁹ and for the most part states tolerate traditional minority religions.²⁰ In Poland, for example, more than ninety-five percent of Poles are Roman Catholic, but Eastern Orthodox, Ukrainian Catholic, and much smaller Protestant, Jewish, and Muslim congregations exist and are treated with respect and/or indifference by the government.²¹

Countries tend to be on the right side of the continuum—that is, the development/support side—only with respect to the dominant majority religion and on the left side of the continuum—that is, the elimination/attack side—only with respect to new religions brought in by outsiders. For example, the government of Poland favors the Catholic majority in many respects; in particular, it allows the Roman Catholic Church special access to television-station frequencies while denying such privileges to other faiths.²² Similarly, the government of Romania grants the Orthodox Church special tax breaks and favors Orthodox clergy in their quest to (re)gain land appropriated by the previous regime, while denying similar requests by Greek Catholics and other minority religions.²³

Under such conditions Protestants in Poland worry that they may have

been better off under the Communists than under the Catholicized new government.²⁴ Likewise, Baptists and ethnic-Hungarian Protestants in Romania are concerned that they will suffer more under the increasingly Romanian Orthodox-driven state than under the prior regime.²⁵ At the same time, new religious and religious transplants from outside find themselves most restricted by law.²⁶ The Jehovah's Witnesses, for example, have been among the groups facing great difficulty in assembling and proselytizing.²⁷

Several factors influence whether individuals and groups view measures taken along this continuum to be legitimate. Psychological theory and research on moral internalization and behavior in relation to legal norms suggests that "law that conflicts with internalized norms, or seeks to introduce new patterns of behavior, will lack the support of people's internal motives to comply."²⁸ Instead, "they will follow the dictates of their conscience, the product of their socialization."²⁹ Whether legal measures square with individual conscience is influenced by several interlinked tensions: the struggle between majoritarian and counter-majoritarian forces; the differing versions of life presented by history as fact, including memory (remembered experiences), myth (storytelling by others), and imagination (created history); the relationships between traditions, cultures, and ideology; other factors in group and individual identity-formation; and one's position as an "insider" or "outsider" to all of the above (a participant inside or outside a community, a story-telling process, a culture, etc.). These factors interact in complex and shifting planes. Some of the possible planes of interaction can be visualized in a "cube of legitimacy" that bears the following designations on its twelve edges: myth, history, memory, imagination, ideology, culture, identity, tradition, outside, inside, majoritarianism, counter-majoritarianism. All these factors play a role in consideration of state practices toward religion in Romania, Ukraine, and Poland.³⁰

The characteristics of individuals considering the cube of legitimacy place additional pressures on its design. The most important characteristics include fear of uncertainty, desire for acceptance, need for security, envy, and low

²⁴See Mojzes, *Religious Liberty*, p. 309.

²⁵*Ibid.*, p. 338.

²⁶For a general discussion on new religions in Eastern Europe, see Sabrina P. Ramet's chapter on "Religious Change and New Cults in Eastern Europe," in her *Social Currents in Eastern Europe: The Sources and Meaning of the Great Transformation*, 2nd ed. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995), pp. 155-177.

²⁷In the summer of 1996, the city of Bucharest prevented an international Jehovah's Witness gathering by denying them accommodations in area hotels. (Observations drawn from authors' experiences in Bucharest during the summer of 1996.)

²⁸Sally M. A. Lloyd-Bobcock, "Explaining Compliance with Imposed Law," in Sandra B. Burman and Barbara E. Harrell-Bond, eds., *The Imposition of Law* (New York: Academic Press, 1979), p. 10.

²⁹Lawrence M. Friedman, "The Idea of Rights as a Social and Legal Concept," in June L. Tapp and Felice J. Levine, eds., *Law, Justice, and the Individual in Society* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1997), pp. 69-74.

³⁰These factors have been drawn from the authors' field work in Romania, Ukraine, and

¹⁹See U.S. Department of State, "Poland Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1997" (www.state.gov/www/goba/human_rights/1997/); U.S. Department of State, "Ukraine Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1997" (http://www.state.gov/www/goba/human_rights/1996/); U.S. Department of State, "Ukraine Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1997" (http://www.state.gov/www/goba/human_rights/1997/). The constitutional guarantees for religious freedom in each of these countries can be found in Arts. 29, 30, and 49 of the Constitution of Romania (December, 1991); Art. 58 of the Constitution of Ukraine (April, 1978, as amended through January, 1995), and the Constitution of the Republic of Poland (November, 1992), Chap. 8, Art. 82, and Chap. 9, Art. 95. See T. Jeremy Gunn, "Freedom of Belief, Association, and Expression in Central and Eastern Europe: A Framework for Analysis of State Fundamental Rights Regimes" (a paper presented at Emory University Law and Religion Program, October, 1997).

²⁰See, e.g., Mojzes, *Religious Liberty*, p. 306 (educational programs and dialogues with Jews sponsored by the Roman Catholic Church); Judith Ingram, "Restitution of Confiscated Property Helps Fuel a Jewish Revival in Eastern Europe, but Some Worry about a Backlash of Prejudice," *The Tampa Tribune*, October 4, 1997; and "Catholics May Get Back Confiscated Property," *The Chicago Tribune*, October 21, 1997.

²¹*Ibid.*

²²Poland Country Report, pp. 7-8.

positions on the most appropriate relationship between church and state and other issues regarding the status of religion in their homeland.

The questionnaire was developed by the authors of this study, then was translated into the languages used in the participating countries. In Romania, a student representative from the University of Bucharest School of Law translated the questionnaire into Romanian. In Ukraine, the head of a human-rights nongovernmental organization translated the document into Ukrainian. In Poland, a graduate student was responsible for translating the questionnaire. Due to limited resources, the questionnaires were not back-translated into English before survey administration occurred. However, the translators worked closely with the authors in making the original translations, and back-translations have taken place since the time of data collection. Care has been taken to note items in which confusion of meaning may have been a concern for respondents. In the end, some of the questions in the survey were changed significantly to communicate better the intentions of the researchers. The local team members also suggested and added additional questions, thus insuring that the survey was more culturally appropriate, but also eliminating the ability to analyze all results across countries.

C. Results

Descriptive statistics were used initially to produce a thorough understanding of the three country samples with regard to religious issues and proselytizing. Because there is a paucity of information from these countries with regard to our topic, we will provide narratives for each sample to give the reader a grounded picture of the experiences and attitudes of each sample.

1. *Romania.* Of the three countries surveyed, Romania had the lowest mean ($X = 2.34$) on religious-service attendance by the respondents. Religious attendance by fathers was also low for this sample ($X = 1.41$), though importance of faith for Romanian fathers was the highest of the three samples ($X = 2.55$). As was the case for each of the samples, the importance of faith for the respondent was fairly high ($X = 1.73$ on 4-point scale with 1 noting "very important").

With regard to experience with varied religious groups, subjects were asked if they had friends who belonged to particular religious groups. This construct was measured as a dichotomous variable; subjects were prompted to acknowledge their agreement or disagreement for each particular religion listed. The religious groups offered were Roman Catholic, Greek Orthodox, Jewish, Muslim, Unitarian, Baptist, other Protestant, Mormon, Jehovah's Witness, Hare Krishna, New Age Religion, Seventh-day Adventist, and "other." For the Romanian sample, if friends belonged to any group at all, subjects reported this fact most frequently (with seventy-eight percent of the respondents answering affirmatively) for the Romanian Orthodox religion. The most frequently cited membership by friends was with the

self-esteem. Where these characteristics predominate, the factors interacting in the cube are likely to be rearranged and to be read to accept state restrictions on minority religions as legitimate measures. Preliminary research and anecdotal interviews by the authors in the region indicate that these factors play an important role in Central and Eastern Europe as rapid social, economic, and political changes have left many people insecure in their own identities and afraid for the future.³¹ The authors chose a couple of these factors to begin to explore in the survey tested below. Further research should explore the relationship between different measures of religiosity and prejudice as well as the relationship to acceptance of legal practices.

II. Methodology of the Survey

A. Subjects

A total of 217 students voluntarily completed the assessment instruments used in this study of proselytizing in Eastern Europe. The procedure was carried out in Romania, Ukraine, and Poland. In Romania, sixty-four volunteers (thirty-seven women, twenty-seven men; M age = 21.22 years) were approached outside a major metropolitan university. In Ukraine, eighty students at an Academy in Kiev (thirty-seven women, forty-three men; M age = 21.00 years) completed the questionnaire. In Poland, seventy-nine subjects (forty-four women, thirty-five men; M age = 25.6 years) completed questionnaires in a metropolitan area; participants were either university students or affiliated with the university in some way.

B. Assessment

A questionnaire was devised to illuminate attitudes toward proselytizing by individuals in the three participating countries.³² It consisted of several demographic questions, along with items targeting participants' attitudes and experiences with regard to religion. Participants were asked questions about those closest to them (family members, friends) in an effort to understand the individual's religious milieu. They were also asked to respond to questions regarding various religious groups (including Protestant groups, New Age religions, and other minority religious groups) and their own interaction with these groups to date. Finally, respondents were asked to rate their attitudes (using a five-point Likert scale: 1 = strongly agree, 2 = slightly agree, 3 = have no opinion, 4 = slightly disagree, 5 = strongly disagree) regarding their

³¹Authors' surveys in Central and Eastern Europe (including but not limited to Romania, Ukraine, and Poland), unpublished, 1995 and 1996. Some of the results of these surveys can be found in Kathryn Minyard Frost's doctoral dissertation, "A Cross-Cultural Study of Major Life Aspirations and Psychological Well-Being (Romania, Aspirations)," for the Psychology Department at the University of Texas at Austin, accepted June, 1997.

³²For a copy of the questionnaire, contact Prof. Julie Mertes, The Claude W. Peitte College

religion or cult to erect a place of worship in the country" ($r = .25, p .05$), materials in the street" ($r = .34, p .01$), and that "the state that banned the Jehovah's Witnesses from holding their convention (with 40,000 people) in their country was correct to do so" ($r = .33, p .01$). These attitudes are characteristic not only of the more faithful in Romania, the hypothetical country that *did* ban a Jehovah's Witness demonstration; in fact, the sample as a whole tended toward agreement with several of these items.

On a scale of one to five (1 = strongly agree, 5 = strongly disagree), there was partial agreement for the following items: the state's withholding permission for major conventions of dangerous religious groups or cults ($M = 2.31, SD = 1.06$), for allowing these religious groups to hand out materials ($M = 1.89, SD = .99$), and for banning the Jehovah's Witness convention ($M = 2.28, SD = 1.08$).

2. Ukraine. Religious attendance in Ukraine averaged somewhat better than two times per month ($X = 2.39$). Unique for this country sample was the fact that mothers are shown to attend church slightly less frequently than fathers (mothers $X = 1.72$, fathers $X = 1.82$). Even so, respondents to the Ukrainian questionnaire noted that faith was "somewhat" to "very" important. In addition, the importance of faith for Ukrainian subjects (mean age = 21) was higher than the same reported for the respondents' parents ($X = 2.37$).

Ukrainians were more likely to respond negatively with regard to the role that religion has played in the country. This country sample was also in agreement that "proselytizing is a danger in my country" ($X = 1.96; 1 = "agree strongly"$). This group also believed, however, that the "government should protect its citizens against religious cults" ($X = 1.9$), though it is not clear what type of protection is wanted, given that they also had mixed feelings about the government's prohibiting proselytizing ($X = 2.76$). Ukrainian subjects had more friends who belonged to the Russian Orthodox religion (eighty percent) than any other religious group, with "Catholic" (forty-three percent) named as the second most likely group for a friend's belonging.

Ukrainians noted few instances of seeing religious groups proselytizing (that is, approaching others with information); they named Mormons (twenty-eight percent), Russian Orthodox (twenty-six percent), and Lutheran groups (twenty-five percent) as most likely to have been seen proselytizing. It seems that this particular sample has been approached directly most frequently by Mormon groups (sixty-four percent), Lutherans (forty-one percent), and Jehovah's Witness members (thirty-four percent).

Ukrainian attitudes toward religion and tolerance revealed an overall attitude that strives for more people to become religious, but only if they are going to become members of particular religions. To illustrate, one strong correlation found was that the more faithful one is the more likely one is to

rare that a subject agreed to knowing a friend who belonged to any of the other religions offered. Additionally, subjects reported knowing no one who be-

The next question, focusing on subjects' experience with religious proselytizing, asked if they had seen proselytizing activity by any of these same religious groups. Jehovah's Witnesses were most often cited as having been seen proselytizing (sixty-eight percent), followed by Mormons (forty-one percent), then Seventh-day Adventists (thirty-three percent). This Romanian sample reported absolutely no activity seen by Jewish or Unitarian groups. The last question describing the activity of religious groups asked respondents if they had been approached personally by any of the groups listed. Romanian respondents had been approached most frequently by Jehovah's Witnesses (sixty-two percent); no other group came close to approaching Romanians as much as this one. It is worth noting that no respondent reported having been approached by Greek Orthodox, Romanian Orthodox, Jewish, Muslim, Unitarian, Lutheran, or Hare Krishna groups.

In a series of items directed toward subjects' attitudes about religion and tolerance, Romanian results show a clear interest in the goodness that religion can bring, though they are concerned about the proselytizing taking place in their country. Consistent with the literature, we used the variable "degree of faith" to denote subjects' faith in their religious belief-systems. A strong correlation was found between "the faithful" and those who believed that "religion has played a positive role in the history of my country" ($r = .51, p .01$). There was a negative correlation, however, between the faithful and the religions to form their own ideas" ($r = -.26, p .05$). This may mean that the faithful expect others to form their own ideas, given the information they have, or perhaps the answers to this item refer to the influx of information on religion coming from various Western groups. The faithful in Romania are also more likely to believe that "religion helps people be more moral" ($r = .38, p .01$).

The more faithful one is, the more likely one also believes that "religious people are generally better citizens" ($r = .53, p .01$). Given this correlation, the following association is not surprising: The more faithful one is, the more likely one believes that "some religions are less genuine than other religions" ($r = .42, p .01$). When Romanian subjects were asked about the role of the state in religious matters, the more important one's faith, the more likely one was to suggest that the "state should take an active role in teaching about religion" ($r = .26, p .05$).

When asked about proselytizing in their country, the more faithful were more likely to report clear concerns about the current influx of religious groups into Romania. For example, the more faithful were more likely to believe that proselytizing is a danger in the country ($r = .32, p .05$), that "the state should not permit a dangerous religion or cult to hold a major convention

the reading of foreign news, it was found that the item regarding the latter correlated negatively with the prohibition of dangerous cults. Thus, those subjects more likely to be interested and invested in foreign concerns were less likely to want to restrict members of various religions from registering ($r = -.28$, $p .05$), and they were unlikely to want to prohibit any religious groups from forming organizations ($r = -.28$, $p .05$).

III. *Analyses: Limitations and Future Directions*

The greatest problem in administering the survey rested in finding people willing to complete it in its entirety. In Romania in particular, would-be respondents were highly suspicious about the motives of asking what was considered to be a controversial set of questions. In addition, as with most surveys, the results may be skewed by respondents who attempted to answer in a manner that would please the surveyors. Again in Romania, the local team member feared that some respondents wanted to impress the Americans behind the survey.

The greatest problem in analyzing the surveys rested in coming up with variables for analysis (for example, which answers could be paired for "intolerant" or for "religious"). When possible, we used the variables prevalent in the literature. Still, our instrument has had no validity or reliability work done on it. Thus, we consider this to be an exploratory study that has produced preliminary data indicating issues worthy of future study.

Our main findings are well situated with those of other studies of the psychology of religion. They are most similar to those of scholars who have found a connection between measures of piety—such as religious affiliation, church attendance, doctrinal orthodoxy, and rated importance of religion—and prejudice toward members of minority groups.³³ That the majority of these studies were conducted in the U.S.A. in the 1960's and 1970's perhaps makes them even more relevant to a study of Central and Eastern Europe today, since the rapid social changes faced in that region today have much in common with the U.S.A. in the earlier period.³⁴

Studies on the relationship between measures of religiosity and prejudice have only occasionally reached inapposite results.³⁵ In general, researchers have found that measures of conservative social attitudes are highly intercorrelated. Thus, some researchers have sought the relationships between piety and prejudice according to such factors as intelligence, education, socioeconomic status, or geographic location (in the U.S.A., studies have tended to be divided between north and south). Once statistical methods are used to isolate the effect of particular variables, the correlation between measures of religi-

about religion ($r = .53$, $p .01$). The more faithful one is, the more likely one is to believe that religion makes people "more moral" ($r = .40$, $p .01$). This particular group (the more faithful) was also more likely to believe that some religions are "more real" than others ($r = .45$, $p .01$). With regard to proselytizing, the more faithful believe that proselytizing is a danger in their country ($r = .38$, $p .01$) and that the state should take steps to protect its people from dangerous religions ($r = .38$, $p .01$), not permit dangerous religions to hold conventions ($r = .48$, $p .01$) or to worship ($r = .40$, $p .01$), and prohibit dangerous religions from registering ($r = .38$, $p .01$).

3. *Poland.* Polish respondents were more likely to report attending religious services than the other two country samples ($X = 3.37$). Perhaps some of the influence on these subjects has come from their mothers, who make up a generation that is also high in religious-service attendance ($X = 3.35$). This particular aspect of the Polish sample is noteworthy, given that the Romanian and Ukrainian samples both show the previous generation (respondents' parents) as less frequent attendees than their children. Comparing the three country samples, faith appears to be most important to the Polish respondents, who were most likely (sixty-four percent) to report being affiliated with the Roman Catholic Church.

In terms of their attitudes toward the relationship between religion and government, Polish respondents felt that their people do not have enough religious information ($X = 1.49$), but they do not necessarily believe that the government should teach others about religion ($X = 2.99$). They do, however, slightly agree that the government should protect against religious cults ($X = 2.09$) and prohibit proselytizing ($X = 2.53$). With regard to proselytizing, Polish respondents noted their friends most frequently being members of the Roman Catholic religion (seventy-eight percent), followed by twenty-nine percent with friends who are Hare Krishna members and twenty-eight percent with Jehovah's Witness members as friends. When asked which groups they had most frequently seen proselytizing, respondents noted Jehovah's Witnesses (seventy-one percent), Hare Krishnas (sixty-one percent), and Roman Catholics (forty-two percent). Subjects report most frequently being approached by Jehovah's Witnesses (seventy-seven percent) and Hare Krishnas (fifty-seven percent).

Regarding Polish attitudes toward religion and proselytizing, it was found that the more important one's faith for Poles, the more one thought the government should protect its citizens from dangerous religions and cults ($r = .30$, $p .05$) and the more they believe the government should prohibit dangerous religions and cults from registering ($r = .32$, $p .05$). Likewise, the more important one's faith, the more likely one believed that the government should prohibit dangerous religions and cults from forming organizations in their country ($r = .32$, $p .05$).

³³See citations in note 9, above.

³⁴The authors' personal observations support this thesis.

³⁵See, e.g., Christopher Bagley, Robert Boshier, and David K. B. Nias, "The Orthogonality

43 The it gets you something else; perhaps it looks good to friends and family).⁴³ The intrinsically oriented are those who

find their master motive in religion. Other needs, strong as they may be, are regarded as of less ultimate significance, and they are, so far as possible, brought into harmony with the religious beliefs and prescriptions. Having embraced a creed the individual endeavors to internalize it and follow it fully. It is in this sense that [one] *lives* [one's] religion.⁴⁴

By contrast, the extrinsic orientation is characteristic of those who

are disposed to use religion for their own ends. . . . Extrinsic values are always instrumental and utilitarian. Persons with this orientation may find religion useful in a variety of ways—to provide security and solace, social ability and distraction, status and self-justification. The embraced creed is lightly held or else selectively shaped to fit more primary needs. In theological terms the extrinsic type turns to God, but without turning away from self.⁴⁵

The present survey did not attempt to make such a distinction between those intrinsically and extrinsically oriented. Future research could explore the relevance of such distinctions.

The main contribution our study brings to the literature is analysis of cultures in which few (or no) such research studies have been conducted. The main contribution that the study brings to those working on religious freedom and human rights is a reminder of the connections between intolerance and the insecurity that comes with increased freedom. Certainly not all the faithful are intolerant, but the surveys indicate that many of those turning to a public expression of religion are more likely to do so out of a sense of fear of change—and fear of change and intolerance toward the unknown go hand-in-hand. The results also have important implications for those working on nationalisms and ethnonational conflict. For members of the majority religion in many parts of Central and Eastern Europe, religion has become a sociopolitical safety measure, a way of reaffirming one's identity with the dominant nation. In these cases, identity with the "national religion" easily becomes a tool of political elites who then manipulate it to dredge up fear of the other.⁴⁶

Conclusion

We sought to explore attitudes regarding religion and tolerance in Romania, Ukraine, and Poland. Caution should be used when interpreting the

osity and prejudice appears to be greatly reduced. One group of researchers found that, after they statistically controlled for the effects of other variables, all their religious measures together accounted for only five percent of the variance in their index of Antisemitism.³⁶ Other studies suggest that the relationships between religiosity and prejudice exist only for white Americans³⁷ or mainly for the elderly³⁸ and less educated.³⁹

Further analysis also indicates that positive correlations between religiosity and prejudice hold only at the mid-range of piety, while at the top level of piety the correlation becomes negative. Officer cadets of the Salvation Army, for example, tested high on piety but demonstrated extremely low levels of racial prejudice.⁴⁰ A variety of studies controlling for the far ends of the scales of church attendance have found that those who attend only occasionally score strikingly higher in prejudice tests than those who do not attend at all or those with extremely frequent attendance.⁴¹ These results suggest a curvilinear relationship between piety and prejudice⁴² that demands, at the very least, that a sample be screened for those at the highest end of the religiosity spectrum and that results from these respondents be screened out or at least isolated.

Taken together, these studies suggest future avenues for further research in Central and Eastern Europe. In particular, future studies might attempt to remove the effects of other variables and to isolate the impact of measures of religiosity on a wider array of factors, such as tolerance of ambiguity or specific forms of prejudice and dogmatism. In addition, a more precise measure of piety should be used to isolate the results of those who score very high on this measure, and separate tests should be conducted on their attitudes. Another major flaw with studies of the psychology of religion is that they have a hard time reaching those who have a private [internal] relationship with religion. Our survey reached mainly those who have either no relationship to religion or those who have a very public relationship—persons who belong to student religious groups or attend church services. Some psychological surveys of religion make reference to the "intrinsic" (interest in religion for the meaning it provides a person) versus the "extrinsic" (going to church because

³⁶Dean R. Hoge and Jackson W. Carroll, "Religiosity and Prejudice in Northern and Southern Churches," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, vol. 12, no. 2 (1973), pp. 181-197.

³⁷Wulff, *Psychology of Religion*, p. 221.

³⁸Chris Brand, "Personality and Political Attitudes," in Richard Lynn, ed., *Dimensions of Personality: Papers in Honour of H. J. Eysenck* (Oxford and New York: Pergamon Press, 1981), pp. 7-38.

³⁹See, e.g., Clyde A. Parker, "Changes in Religious Beliefs of College Students," in Merton P. Strommen, ed., *Research on Religious Development: A Comprehensive Handbook* (New York: Hawthorne Books, 1971), pp. 724-776.

⁴⁰Glenn D. Wilson and Francis J. Liddle, "Social Attitudes of Salvationists and Humanists," *The British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology* 11 (September, 1972): 220-224.

⁴¹See, e.g., Robert W. Friedrichs, "Christians and Residential Exclusion: An Empirical Study of a Northern Dilemma," *Journal of Social Issues*, vol. 15, no. 4 (1959), pp. 14-23.

⁴²This terminology was used by Elmer L. Struven in his "Anti-Democratic Attitudes in

⁴³Wulff, *Psychology of Religion*, p. 228.

⁴⁴Gordon W. Allport and J. Michael Ross, "Personal Religious Orientation and Prejudice," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 5 (April, 1967): 434.

⁴⁵Ibid.

⁴⁶See, generally, Sabrina P. Ramet, *Whose Democracy? Nationalism, Religion, and the Doc-*

pope in the Roman Catholic Church. This was a means of simplification as well as of political instrumentalization of Marxism. "Militant Atheism" was supposed to substitute for religion in satisfying the psychological and spiritual needs of people to free themselves from uncertainty and doubt.² The claim that socialism has religious content is well established in social theory. Apart from Max Weber and Nikolai Berdyaev, B. Russell, J. M. Bochenski, J. Toynbee, and many others have also written about it.

Berdyaev wrote in the *Russian Idea* that socialism had had a religious character with the Russians even when it was atheistic. According to him, "... an enemy of Christianity and of every other religion is not the social system of communism, which suits Christianity more than capitalism, but the false religion of communism with which they wish to substitute Christianity."³ Berdyaev was of the opinion that communism, not as a social system but as a religion, fanatically opposed every other religion, especially Christianity. Communism, he wrote, aspired to offer answers to "religious longings of the human soul" and to give purpose to life.⁴

Sergey Bulgakov likened the violent, intolerant, and exclusive manner of imposing Marxism to "clerical intolerance." He explained that this was the specific dictatorial and nihilistic psychological structure of the revolutionary adherents of this atheistic ideology in Russia.⁵ What Weber regarded as a prerequisite for every effective religion, namely, the sacrificing of the intellect, has in this case become the prerequisite for politics. Divinization and sacralization on the one side and satanization and demonization on the other, as the basic religious mechanisms, became components or accompanying features of the political life and activities.⁶

Jakov Lukić wrote that the conflict of the two religions, secular and ecclesiastical, is always more implacable than other clashes, because such a conflict is one in which both views of the world comprise the whole person. The corollary of that is such a strong exclusiveness and extreme implacability. "It is the clash of two really different religions with completely opposed beliefs, dogmas, ethics, rites, eschatologies, apocalypses, institutions, and mass following."⁷ Although many sociologists dealing with religion note that the basic shortcoming of such a functionalist interpretation of Marxism as an atheistic religion lies in the fact that no clear line is drawn between the religious and nonreligious, even they admit that Marxism and Leninism have taken over some religious functions. They find similarities primarily in the idea of the realization of a just and united realm on earth and in the salvation of the

results of our study simply because the sample sizes from each country are small. Furthermore, our subjects were predominantly college students; therefore, generalization of results should be tailored to this population in particular. Though our results are preliminary, we believe we have uncovered some areas of interest for future exploration, especially on the relationship between attitudes and beliefs and the law pertaining to religious minorities in Central and Eastern Europe.

THE PROSELYTIZING NATURE OF MARXISM-LENINISM

Journal of Ecumenical Studies, 36:1-2, Winter-Spring, 1999

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Political Ideology as a Secular Religion

Sociologists of religion define secularization as the sum total of the process of weakening of the social meaning of religion, as a process of the separation of people from religion, and as a process of changes within religion itself. In developed industrial societies, secularization proceeded under the influence of a series of deeply rooted changes in the structural nature of modern society, partly as a latent process, but also partly as a result of a conscious policy. Similar processes of secularization were partly at work in socialist societies as well, but here secularization developed under different circumstances and with different consequences.

The basic difference between these two types of societies, in the opinion of many researchers, was to be found mainly in the fact that early socialist societies were primarily political societies. Secularization unfolded under the predominant influence of politics. Religious policies appeared to be a consequence of such consciously induced and accelerated secularization. Certain important political institutions acquired religious, parareligious, and quasi-religious traits. Political ideology gradually turned into secular religion, while the political involvement of people acquired the character of religious devotion.

With the victory of the October Revolution in the U.S.S.R., radical changes came about in the official ruling ideology. Many researchers who have studied the cultural factors of development in that country supported the thesis that the Communists, by denying every religion, even the Orthodox, as the ideology of the ruling classes imposed the teachings of "scientific socialism as a surrogate for religion." The party behaved in the state almost as did the

²Zunjić, *Razvoj*, p. 82.
³Zunjić, *Od krize*, p. 73.

133.

⁴Nikolai Berdyaev, *Izvoiti i smisao ruskog komunizma* (Belgrade: Književne novine, 1989), p. 324.

⁵Nikolai Berdyaev, *Ruska ideja: Osnovni problemi ruske misli XIX i početkom XX veka* (Belgrade: Filozofskog fakulteta, 1995), p. 82.

⁶Vera Varuša Zunjić, *Razvoj, religija, rat* (Belgrade: Institut za sociološka istraživanja)