

the main burden of the author's critique is directed at U.S. involvement in such operations at all. His strictures are not leveled at peacekeeping per se, which in its traditional, blue helmet role, he considers to be commendable. Rather, what was reprehensible was the distraction from national interests (as imagined by Fleitz) and the business of military competence that was apparently caused by U.S. involvement in peace support operations. There are of course many ways in which policy elites can construct the meaning of national interests and in which these interests can be pursued. Fleitz's prescription is for the United States to focus on its combat power, using the UN when it serves a particular purpose such as counterterrorism.

The book does not, therefore, dismiss the UN as satanic, but its early years are represented as a hotbed of intrigue against the United States. The subversion of UN Secretary General Trygve Lie and the UN's use as an instrument of U.S. policy in the cold war and afterward hardly fit with this argument. For scholars interrogating the crises of the international system the book's argument can be interpreted as reinforcing a variety of fundamentalism that constructs a Manichean world of fateful struggle. The United States is here depicted as a progressive, democratic, and freedom-loving state, though seemingly from Fleitz's evidence to be constantly fearful of the "evils" outside in spite of its massive military power. Evidence that would challenge the construction is conspicuously but unsurprisingly absent from such narratives as U.S. support for Israeli policy toward Palestinians; U.S. support for human rights-abusing dictatorships and guerrilla movements such as the Marcos, Somoza, and Pinochet regimes; Savimbi's UNITA; and the Taliban and Hussein's Iraq. The author was an analyst for the CIA and worked closely with the Reagan, Bush Sr., and Clinton administrations.

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Slobodan Milosevic and the Destruction of Yugoslavia by Louis Sell.
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Understanding how Slobodan Milosevic came to power, what he did with that power, and how the international community responded to the challenges Milosevic posed sheds light not only on what went so wrong in Yugoslavia but also on what can be done to prevent similar disasters. Louis Sell, a former foreign service officer with eight years of service in Yugoslavia, has the kind of background that permits him to craft a compelling account of the Milosevic legacy. More than a biography, *Slobodan Milosevic and the Destruction of Yugoslavia* offers a readable account of both the domestic Yugoslav side of the country's collapse and the history and consequences of international interventions in the wars in Slovenia and Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo.

Central to Sell's account is the thesis that Yugoslavia in the mid-1980s was a "functioning multiethnic society" (p. 33) and "not inevitably doomed to