

Cyprus: The Failure of Mediation and the Escalation of an Identity-Based Conflict to an Adversarial Impasse*

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The Cyprus conflict is an intractable, identity-based conflict that has challenged the international community for over 40 years. This article provides an overview of the history and sources of the conflict, followed by a description of both official and unofficial third-party interventions. Formal mediation, primarily by the United Nations, has consistently failed to produce a settlement by which the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities could rebuild their fragile political relationship. Unofficial interventions have been limited in consistency, and their direct connection to official decisionmaking has been minimal. More recently, unofficial efforts have focused on the grass-roots level, and have engaged hundreds of influential individuals in bicomunal interactions. Nonetheless, the parties remain locked in an adversarial frame that is self-perpetuating and mutually destructive, and that might only be altered through a comprehensive and sustained unofficial track of conflict analysis and resolution that can overcome the trauma of the past and address the basic needs of the parties.

Introduction

Over the past half century, the international community has been increasingly dismayed and challenged by violent and protracted conflicts between identity groups, defined in racial, religious, ethnic, ideological, or cultural terms. Rothman (1997: 6) has recently elaborated the concept of *identity-based conflict* to denote ongoing struggles between groups that are relatively intransigent and impervious to resolution, because they are 'deeply rooted in the underlying human needs and values that together constitute people's social identities'. When group identities, and the needs that underlie them, are

threatened or frustrated, intractable conflict is almost inevitable. According to Rothman, these conflicts are also connected to 'the more abstract and interpretive dynamics of history, psychology, culture, values, and beliefs of identity groups' (1997: 11). As such, they are multidimensional and complex, with unclear parameters and boundaries, and they thus require special efforts if they are to be accurately defined, adequately analyzed, and effectively resolved. As indicated in the Introduction to this special issue, peace processes need to address identity issues in combination with instrumental ones in order to reach resolution (Pearson, 2001).

In championing the salience of identity-based conflict, Rothman follows a line of theorist/practitioners who have grappled with addressing this disturbing and complex

* The author thanks Tozun Bahcheli, Fred Pearson, and an anonymous reviewer for helpful comments on a previous draft of this article.

phenomenon. Azar (1983, 1990) coined the term *protracted social conflict* (PSC) to denote hostile interactions between communal groups that are based in deep-seated racial, ethnic, religious, and cultural hatreds and which persist over long periods of time with sporadic outbreaks of violence. While these conflicts are struggles for group identity, they involve much more than ethnic differences, and Azar's work led to a model of the sources, processes, and outcomes of PSCs (see Fisher, 1997a). According to Azar, historical factors in multicomunal societies often lead to structural inequalities and differential access to political power, which become expressed in the domination of one group over another with resulting discrimination, victimization, and the socialization of communal hatreds.

In his later work, Azar (1985) adopted *needs analysis* to further explain PSCs, contending that their source lies in the denial and frustration of the basic elements for development that are a compelling need in all individuals and societies. Thus, when a communal group is denied security, distinct identity, effective participation in societal decisionmaking and other basic needs, they will take action to address their victimization, triggering increased state oppression and escalation of the conflict. Azar thus underscores and provides a social and political context for the importance of identity issues in intractable ethnopolitical conflict.

In a similar vein, Burton (1987, 1990a) used the term *deep-rooted conflict* to identify those situations in which basic needs for identity and participation are frustrated and inequalities exist between communities or nations. In promoting a needs analysis of domestic and international conflict, Burton (1990b) proposes that identity groups pursue their fundamental needs at all costs, constrained only by the need to preserve valued relationships. Burton includes the needs for consistency, security, recognition, and distributive justice in his analysis, and thus sees

linkages to structural inequality, underdevelopment, and violence in the same way as Azar. Similarly, he contends that deep-rooted conflicts are not based in interests that can be negotiated, suppressed, or settled, as are disputes, but are based in non-negotiable needs that can only be addressed and satisfied through conflict analysis and resolution.

Rothman (1997) contributes to this line of thinking by distinguishing identity-based conflicts from interest- or resource-based conflicts, which are relatively concrete and well defined with outcomes bounded by the resources at stake (e.g. wages, land, military power). He notes that all identity-based conflicts involve interest conflicts (thus adding to their complexity), but that not all interest conflicts contain identity conflicts, although they may escalate in that direction over time. As with Azar and Burton, Rothman sees conventional negotiation strategies as inappropriate and even disastrous when applied to identity-based conflicts, in that these techniques will make the situation worse by driving the parties farther apart rather than bringing them together. Thus, Rothman states: 'Identity conflicts require that special efforts be made to ensure accurate analysis, definition, and amelioration precisely because such conflicts are not tangible' (1997: 12).

The purpose of this article is to examine one identity-based conflict, that of Cyprus, its escalation to the point of deadlock, and the frustration and futility of conventional mediation attempts to manage it. The exposition will also describe briefly the small number of unofficial and innovative, but unfortunately under-resourced and limited, attempts to address the conflict in line with the prescriptions of Azar, Burton, Rothman, and other conflict resolutionaries. These efforts, although mainly directed at the mass level, follow the rationale expressed in the Introduction that non-negotiable identity concerns and obstacles of distrust may need

to be effectively addressed to some satisfactory degree before negotiations on substantive issues can yield fruit (Pearson, 2001). Finally, the implications of this case for other identity-based conflicts will be identified. It is clear that the field of ethnopolitical conflict resolution requires greater sophistication before the complexity and intractability of such adversarial tragedies can be effectively addressed.

The Cyprus Conflict: 1571–2000

Cyprus is a small island (9,521 km²) in the Eastern Mediterranean, approximately 70 km south of Turkey. With a strategic location at the crossroads of Europe, Asia, and Africa, Cyprus was first colonized by the ancient Greeks and successively conquered by every ruling empire in the region up to 1571, when the Ottoman Turks gained control. The Ottoman period left an indelible stamp on the island as the indigenous population of predominantly Greek Cypriots grew to include almost 20% Turkish Cypriots, descendants of soldiers, settlers, and others of Islamic, Turkish origin. In 1878, Cyprus came under British administration, and following the treaty of Lausanne in 1923 the sovereignty of Cyprus passed from Turkey to Britain until independence was granted in 1960. The population is estimated at about 860,000 with approximately 670,000 Greek Cypriots and a small number of minorities (Armenians, Maronites, Latins) in the south of the island and about 190,000 Turkish Cypriots in the north, including Turkish settlers (Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, 1999).

Intergroup Relations during the Ottoman and British Periods

During Ottoman rule, the two communities functioned more or less separately under the millet system, by which the Orthodox Church of Cyprus was given considerable

control over the affairs of the Greek Cypriots. However, any moves to gain greater independence or alignment with Greece were quashed. In the British period, the two identity groups were also dealt with separately in terms of education, religion, and cultural affairs, with considerable autonomy being accorded to them. At the same time, English became a common language and British-style institutions were established on the island. During the four centuries prior to independence, the Turkish-Cypriot population was widely dispersed throughout the island, living both in separate villages and mixed villages with the Greek Cypriots, although predominantly in separate sections. Social relations between the two identity groups were generally harmonious and mutually beneficial, but religious lines were usually drawn when it came to intermarriage. Economically, the Turkish Cypriots were typically less well off, although they tended to bifurcate into an administrative elite and working-class peasants. The Greek Cypriots were a mix of working class and middle class with a strong entrepreneurial spirit coming more to the fore in the British period. Few Greek Cypriots spoke Turkish, while approximately 40% of Turkish Cypriots spoke Greek, with English becoming increasingly the language of common interchange. Overall, by the time of independence the two groups had formed only a limited sense of being Cypriot, with a much stronger identity attached to their ethnic groups and the two nations that nurtured them. The stage had thus been set for an identity-based conflict of significant intensity.

The Campaign for Independence and the Initial Agreement

The Greek-Cypriot community had agitated for union with Greece (*enosis*) during British rule, and this sentiment erupted into guerrilla warfare in 1955 with the formation of EOKA (National Organization of Cypriot

Fighters). This campaign and the reactions to it resulted in the loss of several hundred lives, and alienated the Turkish Cypriots, who countered *enosis* with a call for partition into separate communities (*taksim*) each associated with its motherland. The Turkish Cypriots aligned themselves more with the British rulers and formed the TMT (Turkish Defence Organization), which engaged in limited intercommunal fighting with the Greek Cypriots until a ceasefire was implemented in 1958.

The 1960 Constitution was a complex power-sharing arrangement with both a national legislature and two communal chambers, and a cabinet, public service, police force, and army in which Turkish Cypriots enjoyed representation at a higher level (30% to 40%) than their proportion in the population (18%). In addition, there were to be separate municipal administrations for the two groups in the five largest towns, thus acknowledging the mutual autonomy evident during British rule. Archbishop Makarios became the first President of the Republic of Cyprus, demonstrating the strong continuing link between church and state, and Dr Fazil Kutchuk was named the Vice-President, as leader of the Turkish Cypriot community. The constitution was backed by a set of treaties which established two sovereign British military bases (Akrotiri and Dhekelia), allowed the stationing of small Greek and Turkish contingents, and provided for military intervention by Britain, Turkey, or Greece to guarantee the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus.

The Unravelling of the Agreement and Increasing Segregation

Unfortunately, the political style of both identity groups remained adversarial following the 1960 agreement, with each seeking to gain advantages within the new arrangement. Three years of maneuvering and stalemate

culminated in the proposal by the Greek Cypriots of a set of constitutional amendments which would reduce the autonomy and representation of the Turkish Cypriots, who had been blocking taxation and other legislation to protest the lack of implementation on the joint municipalities. The amendments were rejected by the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey, intercommunal violence broke out, and the two communities embarked on a hostile and protracted process of separation and segregation.

A study by a Canadian geographer, who had earlier been a UN peacekeeper on the island, estimated that although more than 50% of villages were mixed in 1891, by 1970 this figure had dropped to less than 10% (Patrick, 1976). Also, between 1963 and 1970, some 25,000 Turkish Cypriots and 500 Greek Cypriots had become refugees in their own country. The dispersion of Turkish Cypriots throughout the island in 1960 was transformed into the formation of enclaves in the 1963–74 period. In late 1963 and early 1964, several hundred people were killed, and many others were wounded, kidnapped, and harassed. The destructive effects of this period fell mainly on the Turkish Cypriots.

The increasing level of violence led to concerns in NATO and ultimately to the involvement of the UN, which at Makarios's request established in March 1964 the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) that remains on the island to this day. The remainder of the 1960s and the early 1970s saw continuing hostility and increasing segregation between the two communities, punctuated by intermittent crises sparking Turkish involvement and repeated calls for *enosis* by nationalist elements in the Greek-Cypriot community.

The Events and Aftermath of 1974

In 1974, the situation erupted into a major crisis, precipitated by an Athens-inspired

coup against Makarios, spearheaded by rebellious elements of the Greek Cypriot National Guard. Following fighting between the coupists and left-wing supporters of Makarios, attacks were then initiated on the Turkish-Cypriot villages and enclaves, thereby providing cause under the 1960 agreements for a military intervention by Turkey. After establishing a beachhead and securing a large Turkish-Cypriot area in the Kyrenia/Nicosia corridor and following the failure of diplomatic efforts, Turkish forces moved to occupy approximately 37% of the northern part of the island. A UN-brokered ceasefire extended the original 'Green Line' in the capital of Nicosia across the entire length of the island, where it remains to this day.

The Turkish invasion sparked the exodus of about 160,000 Greek Cypriots to the south, creating a massive refugee problem which, economically, has been managed very successfully with international assistance. Subsequent to the ceasefire, an agreement on the voluntary regrouping of populations resulted in approximately 40,000 Turkish Cypriots moving to the north, while the approximately 10,000 Greek Cypriots left in the north were pressured to go south. Thus the events of 1974, in which several thousand people were killed or went missing, had the effect of creating two homogeneous ethnic zones on the island.

In 1975, the Turkish-Cypriot community, which had previously established a separate provisional administration, declared itself as the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus; Rauf Denktash became the leader of the Turkish Cypriots and remains so to this day. For its part, the Greek-Cypriot administration (essentially the 1960 constitutional structure minus the Turkish Cypriots) assumed the mantle of the Republic of Cyprus, and, as such, has gained international legitimacy and recognition. Given this power, it has had success in securing an economic embargo and cultural and political restrictions on the

Turkish-Cypriot community. In 1983, the Turkish-Cypriot administration unilaterally declared independence as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), an entity recognized only by Turkey.

In 1990, the government in the south initiated a unilateral application to join the European Union (EU), following on previous association agreements. This move further alienated the Turkish Cypriots and turned their eyes toward their motherland. In reaction to the EU accession talks starting in early 1998, the TRNC entered into an association agreement with Turkey, allowing for greater economic and military integration. Thus, unilateral and adversarial strategies on the part of both parties have resulted in a situation of antagonistic partition, enforced by the presence of approximately 30,000 Turkish troops in the north and patrolled by UNFICYP. In concert with the Greek-Cypriot forces in the south, this renders Cyprus into one of the most militarized areas in the world and a potential flash point in Greek-Turkish relations.

The Failure of Official Mediation, 1955–2000

The Cyprus conflict has been on the agenda of the international community for over four decades, and is no closer to resolution – in fact, it may be farther away than ever. The conflict has been the focus of a variety of mediation efforts, from power mediation in the early days to the provision of good offices, to formulations for settlement from various international actors, most notably the UN. For purposes of analysis, Table I links the primary mediation efforts with the major events in the conflict chronologically and also lists the known unofficial interventions to be discussed in the next section. This treatment of mediation efforts will draw mainly on secondary analyses by Camp (1980, 1986), Groom (1981), Kyle (1984), and Wolfe

Table I. Cyprus Conflict: Third-Party Interventions: 1955–2000

<i>Year</i>	<i>Conflict events</i>	<i>Official interventions</i>	<i>Unofficial interventions</i>
1955	EOKA Campaign Apr. 55	Eden Plan Sept. 55 Harding Plan Jan. 56 Radcliffe Report 56	
1960	TMT Formation 57–58 Independence Aug. 60 (imposed) Constitutional Breakdown Nov. 63 Intercommunal Violence Dec 63 UNFICYP Mar. 64	Macmillan Plan June 58 Zurich Accords Feb. 59 London Conference Feb. 64 (failed) Acheson Plan July 64 (rejected)	
1965	Provisional Cyprus- Turkish Admin Dec. 67	Galo Plaza Report Mar. 65 (rejected)	Burton Workshop Oct. 66 (return to negotiations)
1970	Coup d'Etat July 74 Turkish Intervention July, Aug. 74 Turkish Federated State Feb. 75 Transfer of Populations Aug. 76	Intercommunal Talks 68–71 (inconclusive) Intercommunal Talks 72–74 (precluded) Geneva Talks July, Aug. 74 (failed)	Talbot Seminar Nov. 73 (precluded) Doob Workshop July 74 (aborted)
1975		Makarios–Denktash Guidelines Feb. 77 Vienna Talks Mar. 77 (failed) ABC Plan Nov. 78 (rejected) Ten-Point Agreement May 79	Kelman Workshop May 79 (pre-influentials)
1980		Intercommunal Talks 79–83 (inconclusive) Evaluation Paper Jan. 81 Aide Memoire Aug. 83 Proximity Talks 84–86 (rejected Jan. 85) (failed Mar. 86)	Kelman Workshop May 84 (pre-influentials) Doob Meetings 85 (terminated)
1985		UN Mediation 88–90 (impasse)	
1990	EU Application May 90	Set of Ideas 91–92 (rejected) Confidence-Building Measures 93–95 (failed)	Fisher Workshop Dec. 90 (Diaspora Influentials) Fisher Workshop June 91 (Influentials) Fisher Workshops May, June 93 (Educators)
1995	TRNC Integration Aug. 97–	UN Mediation 97 (impasse)	Cyprus Consortium Training 91–96 (Citizen Peacebuilders) Broome Training 94–96 (Citizen Peacebuilders)
	EU Accession Talks Mar. 98– Missile Crisis 97–98	UN Shuttle Discussions	Intractability Workshops 97 (Influentials)
2000		UN Proximity Talks 99–00	Brainstorming Workshops 99–00 (Influentials)

(1986) for the period roughly up to 1983 and by Groom (1986, 1994), Kyle (1997), Laipson, (1989), Mirbagheri (1998), and Wolfe (1992) for later initiatives. In addition, the perspectives of the two sides on negotiations are routinely documented in the *Cyprus Bulletin* and *Kibris, Northern Cyprus Monthly*.

For the purposes of this article, mediation in the pure sense will refer to the intervention of an impartial intermediary who attempts to facilitate a negotiated settlement on a set of substantive issues through reason, persuasion, the control of information, and the formulation of alternatives. In contrast, *power mediation* includes these elements, but adds the use of leverage by an influential third party through promised benefits or threatened punishments (see Fisher, 1990; Fisher & Keashly, 1991). In international affairs, pure mediation is typically practiced by esteemed persons, small powers, or international organizations, especially the UN, while power mediation is more likely to be employed by the major powers, such as the USA or the UK.

The Impotence of Power Mediation, 1955–60

In the de-colonization period after World War II, the British were looking for ways to extricate themselves from Cyprus and yet maintain a strategic presence in the region. As rulers of the colony, they were therefore searching, with some input from Greece and Turkey, for a mechanism to move Cyprus toward self-government with representation of the Turkish Cypriots or at least protection of their minority rights.

In response to the guerrilla campaign by EOKA, the Eden Plan proposed staged self-government with defense, foreign affairs, and public security remaining under the Governor, and with the Turkish Cypriots having proportional representation in the legislature and cabinet. As this proposal neither granted

self-determination (*enosis* to the Greek Cypriots) nor precluded it from the perspective of the Turkish side, it failed to satisfy either party's demands. The subsequent Harding Plan offered majority self-government with guarantees for Turkish-Cypriot minority rights and was similarly rejected. A study by Lord Radcliffe also recommended a majoritarian constitutional model with limited Turkish-Cypriot representation and guaranteed minority rights. As with the previous formulations, which carried the carrot of close-to-full self-government, this one fell on barren ground.

The final British solo attempt at an imposed solution was the Macmillan Plan, which called for a bicomunal constitution and separate municipalities for the two groups, with a continuing role for Britain, Greece, and Turkey. Fear of partition along communal lines led the Greek Cypriots to embrace independence in place of *enosis*, and their rejection of the Macmillan Plan thus paved the way for the Zurich–London accords in which Turkey, Greece, and Britain imposed a power-sharing constitution on the Cypriots in 1959. This agreement precluded both *enosis* and *taksim*, and challenged the Cypriots to leave the past and their ethnic identities behind in order to work together cooperatively – a challenge that fell largely on deaf ears.

Mediation in the Interwar Period, 1964–74

The constitutional breakdown and intercommunal violence of 1963–64 triggered a conference in London of the three guarantor powers and the two communities in which both sides reverted to previous positions – complete independence with the potential for *enosis* for the Greek Cypriots and *taksim* or double *enosis* for the Turkish Cypriots. The conference broke down, fighting continued, and the UN peacekeeping forces moved in. In July 1964, the USA brought forward the

Acheson Plan, which called for an independent unitary state with local administration for Turkish-Cypriot areas and a Turkish sovereign base. Again, each side feared that the other could attain its ultimate objective through this formulation, and the proposal was rejected.

Alongside UN peacekeeping, a mediator (Lasso Galo Plaza) was appointed and issued his formulation for settlement in early 1965, recommending a unitary rather than power-sharing or federal constitution and protection of Turkish-Cypriot minority rights. Turkish rejection of this first attempt at pure mediation was immediate and firm, and the UN peacemaking role was suspended for a time. Escalation of the conflict continued with the Greek Cypriots placing an economic embargo on the Turkish-Cypriot enclaves, which increasingly developed the capacity to manage their affairs and defend themselves with Turkish military assistance. A flare-up of intercommunal violence in 1967 precipitated preparations for a Turkish military intervention and possible war with Greece, which was staved off through successful crisis mediation led by US envoy Cyrus Vance. In addition to the removal of some 12,000 Greek troops, the economic blockade of the enclaves was ended. This mediation effort, however, did not address political issues.

From 1968 to 1974 there was a series of intercommunal talks, arranged with UN assistance, between interlocutors from the two communities. In the first set of negotiations from 1968 to 1971, Rauf Denktash, representing the Turkish Cypriots, with Glafkos Clerides on the Greek-Cypriot side, looked for ways to normalize the existence of the enclaves through separate administrative structures in the constitution. Unfortunately, the talks did not reach a conclusion, in part because local political resistance and outside interference continued to play significant roles. The talks were restarted in 1972 with a more active mediation role played by the UN

representative (Osorio Tafall), but the presumption of a unitary state continued to meet with Turkish resistance. Political turmoil within the Greek-Cypriot community and in its relations with Greece also negatively affected the talks and ultimately precluded their outcome through the events of 1974.

The Post-1974 Agreements-in-Principle

The military division and subsequent transfer of populations changed the demographic map of Cyprus into two geographically separate communities, thus rendering the application of a federal model of government more appropriate than either a unitary state or a power-sharing arrangement. Prior to the final military assault by the Turkish army, Britain arranged a conference in Geneva of the three guarantor powers in late July, which was joined by representatives of the two communities in August. The Turkish side proposed a federation of two ethnically homogeneous zones, with the Turkish-Cypriot area as 34% of the island. The Greek Cypriots countered with a plan for separate communal administration and asked for time to consult their leadership and that of Greece. However, this request was refused and the Turkish army advanced to occupy 37% of the island.

In the aftermath of 1974, it was not until early 1977 that the leaders of the two communities met under UN auspices for high-level discussions. The resulting Makarios-Denktash guidelines consisted of four points, the primary one being that the parties were seeking an independent, non-aligned, bicomunal, bi-zonal federal republic. The others related to the territorial division not being strictly on the basis of population ratio, the freedoms of movement, settlement, and ownership for the Greek Cypriots being implemented with sensitivity to Turkish-Cypriot concerns, and the central government safeguarding the

unity of the state while respecting its bicom-munal character.

The subsequent involvement of a US envoy (Clark Clifford) led to negotiations in Vienna on the nature of the federal arrangement. These talks failed, as many future ones would, on the question of the division of powers between the central government and the constituent administrations, with the Greek Cypriots preferring a strong federal presence and the Turkish Cypriots favoring more of a confederation between strong, equal partners. Another attempt at finding an acceptable formulation was the so-called ABC plan, in which the Americans, with British and Canadian support, proposed a set of constitutional principles and territorial adjustments. The plan also promised economic assistance to support a settlement, thus moving it into the domain of power mediation and possibly increasing the resistance of the parties who did reject it.

UN-sponsored talks between the two leaders (now Spiros Kyprianou and Rauf Denktash) in early 1979 produced a further understanding labeled the ten-point agreement, which laid out the basis and the parameters for resuming intercommunal talks. In addition to accepting the Makarios-Denktash guidelines, this agreement called for the immediate resettlement of the Greek-Cypriot area of Varosha and for the ultimate demilitarization of the island. The way was apparently thus paved for the successful resumption of intercommunal talks on all aspects of a settlement.

At the Doorstep of Settlement, 1980–85

Unfortunately, the restarting of negotiations with the assistance of the UN representative (Javier Perez de Cuellar) did not proceed smoothly, as the parties disagreed over the priority and sequencing of items, each looking for advantages. In 1980, the talks resumed with mediation provided by UN representative Hugo Gobbi and proceeded

slowly, with each side eventually developing its proposal on the major territorial and constitutional matters. In mid-1981, the UN Secretary-General, Kurt Waldheim, presented an evaluation paper, also known as the Interim Agreement, which delineated the points of coincidence and divergence between the two sets of proposals. Unfortunately, the points of difference were substantial, and only a portion of these were identified and addressed with an alternative formulation. It was clear that the two sides continued to jockey for their desired positions on the federal–confederal continuum and the territorial division.

The talks struggled in a difficult political climate and with intermittent periods of suspension, until Perez de Cuellar became UN Secretary-General and prepared an aide-memoire which proposed zones of compromise on the major issues. This period was punctuated with the unilateral declaration of independence by the TRNC in November of 1983, indicating the growing intractability of the conflict.

In the fall of 1984, Perez de Cuellar initiated a round of proximity talks, shuttling back between the two sides with a draft that held promise for an agreement. In January 1985, the Secretary-General organized a high-level meeting in New York with the expectation of concluding a settlement. All major issues were addressed, and the details were to be handled through working groups. Rauf Denktash accepted the document as a whole and as providing adequate direction to the working groups, but to the surprise of de Cuellar, Spiros Kyprianou would only endorse the document as a basis for further negotiations, thus reopening all the major issues.

Retrenchment and Continuing Impasse, 1985–90

Following the failure in New York, there ensued a long period of persuasion, redrafting,

and further high-level proximity discussions. A version presented in April 1985 was accepted by the Greek Cypriots, but now the Turkish Cypriots balked. A further draft agreement presented in March 1986 was accepted by the Turkish Cypriots (and Turkey) as an integrated whole in which no one agreement is binding until the entire document is agreed to, while Kyprianou proposed an international conference or a high-level meeting to deal with issues of particular concern to his side, thus effectively rejecting the document (as did Greece). The Secretary-General maintained that the document included all points which had been agreed to since the end of 1984, but, because one side had rejected it, saw no way to proceed. A period of stagnation followed for the next two years.

Negotiations resumed in 1988, with George Vassiliou as the Greek-Cypriot leader, and reaffirmed the high-level agreements of 1977 and 1979, but did not take the drafts of 1985–86 as a more substantive starting-point. Thus, the parties began at square one and developed papers on issues of most concern to them, which the mediators (UN representatives Oscar Camilion and Gustave Feissel) used as part of the basis for constructing a draft agreement. In doing so, the UN endured some criticism from the Turkish-Cypriot side that it had overstepped its role of providing good offices and had become active mediators, i.e. formulators. Nevertheless, three rounds of talks led to the calling of a high-level meeting in New York in early 1990 at which the Secretary-General anticipated agreement. However, Perez de Cuellar had to acknowledge there was an impasse, and he held the Turkish Cypriots responsible in their search for greater recognition and status than the UN framework could provide.

Continuing Efforts in the Face of the EU Application, 1990–98

The *set of ideas* formulated during 1988–90 was further developed and taken forward by

the new UN Secretary-General, Boutros-Ghali in 1992 as the basis for an overall settlement, but with continuing Turkish-Cypriot resistance. These ideas stipulate two federated states with identical powers to safeguard the cultural identity and ensure the political equality of each community. Powers are divided between the federated states and the federal government, and a bicameral legislature with a federal executive ensures representation from each community. The 1960 treaties are upheld with some modifications and the matters of territorial adjustment and the three freedoms (movement, settlement, and ownership) are also addressed.

By November of 1992, this UN initiative had run its course, with the Greek Cypriots by and large accepting the document, albeit with provisos, and the Turkish Cypriots rejecting approximately 10% of the ideas in ways that were deemed to be outside the UN framework. In essence, the Turkish Cypriots claimed the existence of two sovereign states that would remain sovereign in the federation, and as such could presumably secede, as opposed to accepting a single sovereignty vested in the federation. Differences also existed on the questions of the return of displaced persons and the nature of the territorial adjustments. The Secretary-General called on the Turkish Cypriots to adjust their positions and recommended a list of measures to create a new climate of confidence in order to assist movement toward a comprehensive settlement.

The 1993–95 period was dominated by the UN initiative on confidence-building measures in the face of repeated failure to get movement on substantive issues. The most significant proposals were the reopening of Nicosia International Airport with joint access to both communities and the opening up of the Turkish-held area of Varosha to resettlement by Greek Cypriots with UN control. Some optimism existed in early 1994 that proximity talks between Rauf

Denktash and the new Greek-Cypriot leader Glafkos Clerides with mediation by UN Representatives Joe Clark and Gustave Feissel would lead to agreement and implementation, and a document detailing the measures was subsequently accepted by the Greek Cypriots. However, the process derailed when an intervention by US diplomats resulted in amendments designed to meet Turkish-Cypriot objections that were then rejected by the Greek Cypriots. Informal meetings between Clerides and Denktash on the island as well as exploratory talks organized by the USA and the UK were unable to break the impasse, and the negotiations went into limbo for some time.

In mid-1997, the new UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, with strong US and UK support, initiated a series of negotiations between Clerides and Denktash mediated by UN Representative Diego Cordovez. The initial talks dealt with a revised set of ideas for a comprehensive settlement to which the two sides responded. However, the second round of talks ended in stalemate as the Turkish-Cypriot side protested the emerging EU decision to begin accession negotiations with the government in the south. Almost simultaneously, the TRNC entered into an association agreement with Turkey to achieve partial integration in economics, finance, security, defense, and foreign affairs. While both sides remained ostensibly committed to a bi-zonal, bicomunal federation, the preferred nature of that arrangement appeared to differ considerably between them. Hopes to restart the mediation process in 1998 were quashed by the initiation of the EU accession negotiations, with Turkish-Cypriot refusal to participate, their insistence that these negotiations be halted, and their proposal for a Cyprus confederation of two sovereign states. The Turkish Cypriots thus continued to press for international recognition of their regime, and insisted that the negotiations should be on a state-to-state basis.

During 1998, the UN Representative on the island, Dame Ann Hercus, initiated a series of shuttle discussions with the two sides to ease tensions and to promote progress toward a settlement. In late 1999, proximity talks were restarted under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General, with Alvaro de Soto serving as the mediator. Three series of talks have been held, mainly with an exploratory focus, and further talks were under way in the fall of 2000. These talks were offered to equal parties, rather than on an intercommunal basis, and the sessions so far have served to acquaint the UN mediators with the positions of the two sides on the core issues of security, territory, property, and the division of powers.

Limited Unofficial Interventions, 1966–2000

Given its seriousness and intractability, the Cyprus conflict has received some attention from the emerging field of conflict analysis and resolution over the past 30 years. Unfortunately, these unofficial interventions have been characterized by a lack of continuity and/or connection to both the decisionmaking level and official mediation efforts. Thus, these attempts are best seen as initial demonstrations as to what a different approach to conflict management might provide to this protracted social conflict.

Early Efforts, 1966–74

In the wake of the rejected Galo Plaza report, the two sides refused to continue the UN mediation process. However, the conflict had gained the attention of John Burton and his colleagues at the newly established Centre for the Analysis of Conflict, University College London, who were intent on applying their problem-solving method of *controlled communication* to other conflicts in the wake of their successful involvement in the Malaysia/Indonesia dispute (Burton, 1969;

Fisher, 1997a). UN officials discounted Burton's idea, insisting that the two parties would not meet, but providing their approval if indeed they would. Following letters to the leaders and a visit by Burton to the island, the two sides readily agreed to send high-level representatives to London for a five-day meeting in October of 1966. As Burton's method was still developing, there were some difficult and frustrating sessions before the analytical mode of the workshop was established and the parties shared their differing perceptions of the conflict and their evaluations of various directions toward resolution (Mitchell, 1966, 1981). The two sides also explored the possibilities for returning to negotiations and in principle decided to do so. Follow-up evaluation indicated that the London workshop had a significant impact on the resumption of UN mediation (Mitchell, 1981). Unfortunately, the potential interference between the official and unofficial tracks as well as practical difficulties in mounting further interventions precluded continuing involvement by the Burton group.

In 1973, the slow progress in the intercommunal talks prompted an informal seminar in Rome organized by the Center for Mediterranean Studies of the American Universities Field Staff, bringing together the two interlocutors (Clerides and Denktash) with Cyprus experts from the USA, the guarantor powers, and other European countries (Talbot, 1977). Five days of discussions focused on the sticking-points in the negotiations and ways to overcome them, apparently with some success. The experts were able to provide new perspectives and options, and the negotiators were able to move toward agreement on some of the contentious issues. According to Talbot (1977), the seminar developed momentum toward a comprehensive agreement, and the intercommunal talks were restarted. Apparently, the two sides reached virtual agreement in the talks and

were consulting with Turkey and Greece when the tragic events of 1974 occurred. Any possible gains from the seminar and the talks were thus precluded by the dramatic change in the situation on the ground. This is particularly unfortunate, because the relative fluidity and receptivity to intervention prior to 1974 was replaced by the shock and trauma of major hostilities and reciprocal atrocities. The significant escalation of the conflict thus added to its intractability and resistance to resolution (Mandell, 1992).

Another informal intervention that fell victim to the realities of 1974 was a problem-solving workshop being organized by Leonard Doob, a US social psychologist who had previously applied human relations methods to the conflicts in the Horn of Africa and Northern Ireland (Doob, 1974; Fisher, 1997a). Doob took part in the Talbot seminar and had explained his methods to the participants, and at the invitation of the two sides moved forward to plan a workshop that would bring together some twenty Turkish- and Greek-Cypriot influentials. The design was to begin by building trust and understanding and then shift to a consideration of creative ideas for reaching a settlement and rebuilding the relationship. All was in place, and the participants were scheduled to depart Nicosia one week after the coup d'état occurred. The workshop was cancelled at the last minute, but Doob maintained his interest in Cyprus, looking for a time when the two sides would simultaneously be interested in further unofficial involvement.

Interventions Alongside Mediation Efforts, 1974–90

Following the dramatic realignments of 1974, the parties appeared to move into a period where one or both were not receptive to unofficial interventions (Doob, 1987). However, in 1979, and again in 1984, Herbert Kelman and his colleagues at Harvard University organized two extended

weekend workshops bringing together less influential participants from the two sides. The 1984 session was sponsored by the Middle East Institute with US government support in the hope that new approaches might prove to be useful in resolving a chronic problem where official methods had consistently failed (Stoddard, 1986). The objectives were to assess attitudes and how these might be changed, and to suggest arrangements to lessen the impact of negative attitudes on the conflict. Following the approach of interactive problem-solving (Kelman & Cohen, 1979), the third-party facilitators were able to help the participants redefine the conflict in terms of underlying concerns and areas of compatibility. According to Stoddard (1986) the 1984 workshop allowed the participants to establish trust, understand key issues, and affirm the principles of a potential settlement. Unfortunately, neither of these interventions was well connected to key decisionmakers or the official diplomatic track, and thus any effects on the conflict were minimal. However, the potential utility of the method was clearly demonstrated.

Leonard Doob maintained his involvement in the Cyprus conflict, and visited the island several times in the decade following the coup. In 1986, coinciding support from the two sides resulted in a green light for an unofficial intervention, and with the cooperation of James Holger, the UN Representative on the island, Doob was able to bring together eight influential individuals from each community for a series of meetings in the buffer zone. The meetings were managed by the Cypriots themselves, and were essentially open discussions that went on for about three months on a weekly or twice weekly basis. The participants exchanged information and perspectives, and were planning cross-line visits when the Turkish-Cypriot administration withdrew its permission for the meetings. This resulted in some negative

reactions in the Greek-Cypriot press, and a public statement from the Greek-Cypriot participants contended that an atmosphere of trust and goodwill had been established, and that there had been a useful exchange of views on various topics, including the basic concerns of each community (Doob, 1987). Given the termination of these meetings in an air of acrimony, it is difficult to ascertain whether they had any positive effects on official interaction.

Recent Unofficial Activities, 1990–2000

The ending of the Doob meetings left a negative atmosphere that had a dampening effect on unofficial interventions for some time, although there were informal intercommunal contacts partly facilitated by various external actors (Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis, 1993). In 1988–89 the now defunct Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security sponsored a series of academic style-seminars that provided for analyses of the conflict and an exchange of views among Cypriots who attended (Lafreniere & Mitchell, 1990; Salem, 1992). This initiative laid the foundation for an unofficial intervention organized by the present author that resulted in four conflict analysis workshops in the early 1990s (Fisher, 2001).

The first workshop brought together Canadians of Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot origin who had spent their early lives on the island and who still identified strongly with the Cyprus problem (Fisher, 1991). The focus was on establishing dialogue, analyzing the conflict and its escalation, and creating ideas for de-escalation and resolution. The participants exchanged useful perceptions, came to some shared realizations, and built consensus on the nature of a renewed understanding necessary to resolve the conflict.

A second workshop was held with influential members of the two communities with connections to their respective leaderships. The agenda moved from an analysis of the

underlying concerns of the two sides to the preferred qualities of a renewed relationship and to potential peacebuilding activities (Fisher, 1992). Subsequent to the workshop, participants were able to establish an annual bicomunal art exhibit, conduct a series of cross-line meetings of business leaders, and eventually establish a joint steering committee to foster intercommunal interactions with the support of a US-based training project (see below). Thus, the intervention achieved the invention stage of Rothman's ARIA framework in the domain of peacebuilding, but did not have an effect on peacemaking.

Additional workshops were planned at the time of the UN effort to implement confidence-building measures, in which education had been identified as a priority area requiring bicomunal cooperation. This, combined with a high degree of interest in both communities, led to the holding of two conflict analysis workshops on the role of education in maintaining the conflict and its possible contribution to peacebuilding (Fisher, 1994). Dialogue and analysis among the educators paved the way for developing ideas for peacebuilding projects in the education sphere, in which bicomunal subgroups created mutually acceptable proposals. These project ideas (on curriculum development, student exchanges, and joint teacher activities) were taken forward to meetings with the now functioning Bicomunal Steering Committee and over the ensuing years have found expression in various initiatives, but always in the face of considerable resistance from extreme nationalists, particularly in the Greek-Cypriot community (Fisher, 2001).

In the 1990s, a series of US-based initiatives has provided opportunities for training in conflict resolution to participants from the two Cypriot communities, as well as an ongoing forum for unofficial dialogue, conflict analysis, and peacebuilding. This work

was initiated in 1991 by Louise Diamond, with support from the NTL Institute for Applied Behavioral Science and her own Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy (IMTD), co-founded with John McDonald. The initial phases were carried out in cooperation with the previous workshop project, including an overlap of participants and facilitators, and support for the formation of the Bicomunal Steering Committee (Diamond & Fisher, 1995).

In 1994, IMTD and NTL were joined by the Conflict Management Group (CMG), with co-direction provided by Diana Chigas, to form the Cyprus Consortium, which over a five-year period organized a variety of training workshops for educators, graduate students, trainers, policy leaders, and other 'citizen peacebuilders' in the two communities (Diamond, 1997). It was not the intention of the Cyprus Consortium to infringe on the work of official diplomacy, but rather to create a complementary social peacebuilding process that must be part of the eventual resolution of the conflict. At the same time, many of the participants, especially in the policy leaders' workshops, have been influential political actors, and it can be assumed that the learnings and ideas generated in the workshops have been available to the official interactions.

Also in 1994, another unofficial, US-funded effort began with the establishment of a resident Fulbright Scholar position that has continued for a period of years. The first scholar in residence, Benjamin Broome, worked with the Cyprus Consortium in the summer 1994 workshops, and then organized a series of planning and design workshops using the Interactive Management methodology (Broome, 1997). Over a nine-month period, a bicomunal group produced an analysis of the situation, a vision for the future of peacebuilding in Cyprus, and an integrated set of proposed activities. As with the work of the Cyprus Consortium, these

sessions were not designed to deal with national political issues, but to provide direction and support for the growing citizen peacebuilding movement.

Broome extended his appointment in Cyprus through to 1996 and provided further training and support to a growing community of peacebuilders in concert with the continuing activities of the Cyprus Consortium, which by 1996 had provided training to over 500 individuals (Diamond, 1997). Broome's initial bicomunal group of 32 grew to over 300 individuals involved in fifteen different groups (e.g. young business leaders, educators) and project foci (e.g. the concept of federation, EU issues). Thus, the initial training work has evolved to become a central means of providing dialogue between the two communities (Broome, 1997). Participation continued expanding to an estimated 1,500 people involved in various bicomunal activities during 1997, most of them starting as participants in a conflict resolution training workshop (Broome, 1998). Successive Fulbright scholars were appointed to work with existing groups and to provide training in facilitation to newly formed groups. At the same time, the conflict resolution training function has been passed on to local trainers who provide workshops both within and between their communities. Unfortunately, in December of 1997, the authorities in the north stopped giving permission for Turkish Cypriots to cross the Green Line into the UN buffer zone, where most bicomunal events are held. This decision has more or less put a stop to bicomunal interaction, although some recent events have been allowed to go ahead.

In 1997, the Cyprus Consortium initiated a project on the intractability of the conflict, designed to analyze why it has resisted resolution for so long and to examine ways of breaking the impasse. A bicomunal study group of influentials, mainly from the policy

leaders' workshops, was formed to look at various factors contributing to intractability with the assistance of an international group of resource experts. Following organizational meetings on the island, the study group convened for two major events off the island in 1997, but further meetings were precluded by the Turkish-Cypriot closure of December of that year.

Most recently, CMG and IMTD have joined forces with the World Peace Foundation (WPF), headed by Robert Rotberg, in an expanded Cyprus Consortium to undertake a project designed to address the obstacles to negotiation. A select study group of Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot influentials, some with direct connections to their respective leaders, have met in a series of joint brainstorming sessions led by the third-party facilitators. During 1999 and 2000, this group has engaged in several meetings off the island to produce innovative ideas on improving the negotiating process and on constructing a mutually acceptable settlement. This unofficial effort builds on a history of successful involvement by the Cyprus Consortium and is the most directly connected intervention to negotiations since the Burton and Talbot meetings.

Conclusion

The Cyprus problem is clearly an identity-based conflict in Rothman's (1997) terms, in which group identities and related needs have been expressed, frustrated, and threatened, leading to escalation and stalemate. In terms of the ARIA framework, the parties have become stuck in the first phase of adversarial framing and have not moved to the later phases of dialogue and reconciliation. In their adversarial stance, they talk almost solely about the *what* of the conflict, in *we-they* terms, and bring forward their opposing solutions in the context of positional bargaining. Antagonism is expressed,

but is not used as a springboard for reflexive reframing, invention or action planning. The parties are caught in self-defeating processes of antagonism, including blaming the other side, attributing negative qualities to them, and polarizing one's own side against them.

Given the approach of the parties, the UN mediation process has been an exercise in frustration and futility, in which underlying concerns have rendered reasonable discourse and concession-making extremely difficult. The mediators have exercised skill, persistence, and respect, but the arguments and formulations they offer do not adequately address the deep fears and basic needs of the parties. Positional bargaining based in a realist, power-coercive philosophy of inter-party relations has dominated the interaction. Between 1963 and 1974, when the balance of power shifted toward the Greek Cypriots, they were less forthcoming in negotiations, while the Turkish Cypriots suffered in their enclaves. After 1974, when the Turkish side gained the upper hand, the Greek Cypriots exhibited greater flexibility, but in the face of increased firmness. This analysis parallels that offered by Mirbagheri (1998), who concludes after a detailed examination of the conflict and UN mediation efforts, that deep intercommunal mistrust has contributed significantly to failure and impasse. Mirbagheri also confirms how the shifting balance of power has been exploited at different times by each side, only to see their more strident approach countered by greater resistance from the other.

Throughout mediation, at a number of points when one side accepted the UN proposals, the other side would balk, almost as if a settlement acceptable to the other had to be suspect or not good enough. When modifications were made to redress the concerns, the first party would now remove its acceptance, even though the substance had changed little. Such failures and frustrations in negotiations then become additional issues in the

conflict, enabling the parties yet again to blame the other side, adding to escalation and intractability. This highly competitive, suspicious, and adversarial approach to negotiations focused on self-interests and hardened positions demonstrates the inappropriateness of traditional negotiation and mediation in emerging and escalating identity-based conflicts. In such cases, it is questionable whether even the most skilled mediators can assist the parties in overcoming the multitude of barriers to a negotiated settlement (Ross & Stillingier, 1991).

It has long been known that parties enter into mediation for a variety of reasons, only one of which is to achieve a compromise settlement. Recently, Richmond (1998) has articulated a theoretical framework that enables the examination of international mediation from the point of view of the disputants. His analysis concludes that parties may have devious objectives, that is, other than a compromise solution, such as legitimation of status, avoidance of concessions by prolonging the process, and the pursuit of various means of gaining strength and advantage. The outcome, as in the Cyprus case, is that mediation becomes protracted and the conflict intractable. Elsewhere, Richmond (1996) suggests that neither community in Cyprus should fault the UN without examining its own commitment and approach to mediation. Further, he contends that neither side has wanted a compromise settlement, but has viewed mediation as a way of pursuing their initial (and incompatible) objectives. Thus, the long succession of mediation efforts has done little more than strengthen the status quo on the island (Richmond, 1999).

Some realists might contend that the difficulty in negotiations has been due to the pure mediation approach practiced by the UN, and that a shift to power mediation with the application of rewards, sanctions, and punishments would move the parties toward

settlement. In other words, manipulation must be added to communication and formulation in order for mediation to be successful in intransigent conflicts. However, the parties in Cyprus, particularly the Turkish Cypriots, appear to be relatively unmoved by coercive tactics, or by promises of increased economic well-being. If anything, attempts at power mediation and other forms of pressure have consistently failed and may actually have increased the parties' resistance to resolution (Keashly & Fisher, 1990). Clearly, other means of creating 'ripeness' need to be found in such situations.

The unofficial interventions that have addressed the Cyprus conflict have rarely had the objective of transferring outcomes to the official mediation track, let alone creating ripeness for settlement. Thus, in terms of Pearson's (2001) framework, we have seen intensive elite participation in instrumental issues and some mass participation on identity issues, but little connection between the two. Nonetheless, two of the early initiatives appear to have served a useful pre- or para-negotiation function. The 1966 Burton workshop was designed to surface antagonisms and then move toward a more reflective, analytical approach to expressing and understanding the conflict. This was accomplished to some degree, and the subsequent receptivity of the parties to UN efforts is seen by the organizers as an indicator of success. The 1973 Talbot seminar was a different form of analysis, but did allow the parties to stand back and look at some sticking points from different perspectives, apparently in ways that augured well for a settlement, which was unfortunately precluded by the 1974 coup.

The design of the Kelman and Fisher workshops parallels the process of the ARIA framework, especially in surfacing antagonisms, allowing for deeper, reflective analysis of underlying needs and fears, and moving toward creating ideas for resolution or proposals for peacebuilding initiatives. The

initial work by the Cyprus Consortium and the Fulbright Scholars, while focusing primarily on training, has provided limited opportunities for dialogue, reconciliation, and problem-solving (see Fisher, 1997b). The most recent initiative by the expanded Consortium, using joint brainstorming to overcome obstacles in negotiation, is pointed in the right direction for transfer to the official level, and some of the participants are well connected to the decisionmakers. In general, however, almost all of the unofficial efforts have been limited in understandable ways that constrain their possible effects on the official mediation process.

What is required to test the ARIA framework and similar approaches in the Cyprus conflict and elsewhere is a comprehensive and sustained unofficial track of dialogue, analysis, reframing, inventing, and action planning that engages influentials from the two sides who are close to or involved in policymaking and negotiations. Such an effort needs to have the magnitude of a 'cycle-breaking intervention' in which unilateral and adversarial moves come to be seen as conflict enhancing and counterproductive. Through processes of dialogue and reconciliation, parties need to build or rebuild the semblance of a respectful, mutually beneficial relationship in which basic needs are addressed for all. Part of this process needs to express and assuage the hostility and trauma produced by past atrocities and violations of human rights by both sides. Another element needs to address the important role of culture in shaping each party's approach to the conflict and their behavior at the interface. It is possible that the *culture of conflict* in each society as expressed in its perceptions, strategies, and reactions with respect to the conflict is not conducive to mutually productive interchange (see Ross, 1993). And part of the effort needs to connect the deeper analysis of needs to the interests and positions that must be negotiated for a settlement to occur. The

resources currently being allotted to unofficial interventions are minuscule in comparison to the effort required to accomplish these ends.

In the absence of cycle-breaking interventions, the Cyprus conflict continues to harden and intensify. The current impasse at the political level is paralleled by a continuing escalation in the military arena (Bahcheli & Rizopoulos, 1997). A defense pact with Greece has been coupled with a military strengthening in the south, leading to Turkish modernization of weapons and the rendering of the island into one of the most militarized areas in the region. The ill-fated move by the Greek Cypriots in 1997–98 to acquire an advanced missile system from the Russians led to Turkish threats of attack, international anguish and pressure, and an eventual decision not to deploy the missiles in Cyprus. Such policies of toughness and brinkmanship could spark another war on the island and between the motherlands.

The conflict on Cyprus is mirrored by identity-based conflicts in many other parts of the globe at various stages of escalation and intractability. Partly through the application of realpolitik and the use of force and violence, the landscape of the world has become littered with adversarial tragedies. Until the international community commits extensive resources to the development of innovative methods of conflict analysis and resolution, this will continue to be the case. These unofficial methods must take their appropriate place alongside traditional forms of third-party intervention in a complementary manner conducive to de-escalation, settlement, and resolution (Fisher & Keashly, 1991).

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